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
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Populism and Global Governance:
Challenges and Implications

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Preface

Of late, populism has become a buzzword to describe a range of striking developments. Its proponents see it as a form of democratic uprising of the silent majority against political and economic elites and a way to upset the existing rules that left many behind. At least that is the promise. Its opponents see populism as building on pernicious features of identity politics and undermining democracy, threatening human rights, and particularly imperilling the rights of minorities. They fear a return to political and social conditions that marked the 1930s: economic and societal upheaval, the rise of far-right nationalist movements, and jingoistic governments that together generated antagonism and ultimately conflict among rival states. With the election of professed populist leaders in a number of countries around the world and the apparent association between populist politics and major developments like Brexit, the issue is hard to ignore. Populism, it seems, has gone global.

The links between populism and global governance are slowly starting to be addressed in academic writings, both for normative and scholarly reasons. Normatively, there is a fear that existing rules of global governance are under threat and that multilateral institutions are slowly being dismantled. While the challenges the world faces today—including environmental degradation, climate change, terrorism, regional wars, refugees, and financial volatility—inevitably cross international borders, many states are turning inwards. Without strong international rules and institutions, how will these global challenges be addressed? In turn, some are increasingly conscious of how these social and political developments reveal gaps in the analytic value and practical utility of scholarship. In short, perhaps many of our concepts and theories—the foundational assumptions of the academic discipline concerning how the world functions—might need to be rethought?

While the term 'populism' has become ubiquitous in scholarly and public debates, it is also a concept that is difficult to pin down. Leaders and political parties are branded as populist, whole countries and regions have been deemed to be experiencing a 'populist turn,' and international institutions are seen to be threatened by populism. When we started discussing the overarching topic of this year's CGC Junior Scholar Working Paper,

our young scholars took us to task, asking for definitions and clarifications. In the spirit of debate, we, as a group, decided to encourage diversity, not just in their choice of topics, but also in how they chose to interpret what populism was. In working on this year's theme *Populism and Global Governance: Challenges and Implications,* we wanted them to be unrestrained and pursue their individual ideas and with that also contribute to this still under-defined concept.

Each of the six essays in this volume has a unique message. Together they highlight the manifold challenges experienced by features of the international system in our present moment. Some of these studies have gone in-depth, taking on developments around individual institutions or countries. Others have taken a more conceptual approach. They nicely highlight that populism raises challenges in different corners of the world and on a range of pressing issues: Brexit, humanitarian aid, the International Criminal Court, economic governance, NATO, and the nature of democracy itself.

The Centre for Global Constitutionalism is immensely proud of our internship programme. Each autumn we hold a competitive selection process to fill a handful of positions for the academic year. Interns are involved with the Centre more broadly, assisting with organising our events and acting as our link to the St Andrews student body. They actively participate in our seminars and talks and are an important part of the intellectual life of the Centre over the year. Our 2018-19 cohort are composed of undergraduate and MLitt students from the School of International Relations and the School of History and as a result, their interests are immensely varied.

As part of their internship, each intern develops an original essay on our yearly overarching topic, which we present in this collective volume. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of their intellectual interests concerning global governance and populism. While we guided them through the process and provided them with individual feedback, the work here is the product of their own thinking. They as a group were their biggest support network, providing peer review on each other's drafts in a collaborative workshop. This year, for the first time, we also involved our Associate Fellows as academic mentors. Erika Brady, Mary Dodd and Robin El Kady — all PhD candidates in

the School of International Relations—provided intellectual guidance and additional feedback. Erika provided additional superb assistance copy-editing and formatting the final essays. We are grateful for their help.

We relish the opportunity to interact with these emerging scholars and are proud that the Centre can help in fostering an intellectual community interested in global governance and international law at St Andrews. We hope you enjoy the third annual volume of the Junior Scholar Working Paper Series. Happy reading!

Adam Bower and Mateja Peter
Co-directors, Centre for Global Constitutionalism

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How Could the Rise of Populism in Europe Affect NATO?

Emily Matthews

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was set up in 1949 following the horrors of a world war that saw neighbouring countries turn on each other and much of the continent seized by the grip of fascism. The Alliance was set up in order to ensure that this would never happened again, the founding members pledging to settle their disputes by 'peaceful means' (NATO Treaty 1949) and to strengthen their 'free institutions' (ibid.) in order to promote stability, security, and wellbeing between them. With the central principle of common defence enshrined in Article Five - where an attack on any one member by an outside party will count as an attack on all members – the Treaty was intended to keep Europe stable while countering any outside threat, particularly from what would become soviet bloc countries. This is a purpose that the alliance has fulfilled, succeeding in ensuring that interstate conflict in Europe has become a rarity and that meaningful cooperation both between European states and across the Atlantic has become a reality.

However, the rise of populism in Europe and the US could undermine this stability and cooperation, threatening to undermine the foundations of NATO and the liberal democratic order. Since the end of the Cold War, a commitment to liberal democratic ideas has been one of the uniting forces that has allowed NATO to remain a powerful force in Europe. Thus, any threat to democracy also directly threatens the alliance itself. Populism, as defined by Jan Müller is the 'shadow' of representative democracy whose central feature is a 'moralised form of antipluralism' that incessantly speaks 'in the name of the people as a whole' (Müller 2017, 20). In Müller's conception of the term, it does not describe exclusively either left or right-wing groups, but instead any person or group who is critical of elites *and* claims that they and they alone represent the people. Thus defined, Müller sees populism as being inherently dangerous to democracy, as a democratic system requires pluralism and a toleration of dissent to fully live up to the label. This is the definition of populism that will be employed throughout this essay, as it encapsulates the main ethos and character of the 'populist' parties and politicians gaining power and prominence across Europe and in the United States. It also displays clearly just why

populism presents such a threat to liberal democracy and its associated institutions, despite claims by populist leaders to democracy.

Threats to the alliance from the US

The US, along with Canada, the United Kingdom and nine other European states was one of the original NATO members (NATO 2018a), the end to its long period of non-intervention motivated by deterring Soviet expansionism and forbidding a revival of the nationalist militarism in Europe (NATO 2019) that had caused two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. Successive US presidents, while often being critical of NATO, have continued this commitment to the alliance and the principles of common defence. However, the election of Donald Trump has caused real doubts about the US's future commitment to the alliance. In the two years since taking office, Trump has proved to be extremely hostile to multilateral agreements, treaties and alliances, most notably pulling the US out of the Paris Climate Change Accords and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The latest target of Trump's ire now seems to be NATO, recently stating in his second State of the Union speech that the US had historically been 'treated very unfairly by NATO' (O'Connor 2019), primarily citing unequal levels of funding from Europe versus the US as the source of this unfair treatment. This is familiar rhetoric from Trump, who previously referred to NAFTA as 'the worst deal ever' (Gordon, 2018), and has begun to clearly favour what has been termed a more 'transactional' approach (Linn 2017, 88), where the US would instead pursue bilateral deals and solutions, aiming to put 'America first' (ibid.), rather than having to compromise in the interests of a range of member countries. This is an approach that has been followed by countries such as Russia and China, but marks a major shift in US policy, as traditionally it has been the 'leader in global multilateral affairs' (ibid.), particularly in the case of NATO.

Trump's aversion to multilateralism may be inconsistent with the US's historical approach, but it is entirely consistent with his populist credentials. As Müller tells us, populism is a 'moralised form of antipluralism' that speaks 'in the name of the people as a whole' (Muller 2017, 20). It also involves being extremely critical of elites and claiming that

only you represent the people. While this is a controversial idea, with some including Barack Obama (The Economist 2016), calling for people to cease applying this term to Trump, this conception of populism is one that Trump appears to fit entirely. Cas Mudde calls populism an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated in two homogenous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' (Mudde 2018). It does not seem to be a stretch to apply this term to Trump, who in his inaugural address talked about how 'a small group in our nation's capital' has reaped the rewards, while 'the people' (The White House, 2017) have borne the cost. He has also repeatedly spoken about what 'the people' (Rice-Oxley and Kalia 2018) want, incessantly framing anyone who disagrees with this as part of the nameless elites responsible for the ills of the nation.

Trump, who I would characterise as the epitome of a populist, sees those involved with NATO and other multilateral institutions as being the 'elites' gone global, a group of faceless bureaucrats that take hard earned American money away from 'the people' and deliver little for the US in return. Trump's concerns about NATO may appear to be purely financial, but his seeming mistrust of the alliance simply forms the latest in a long line of moves, such as withdrawing from NAFTA and the JCPOA, that have been framed as returning power to the US. This is presented as ultimately returning agency and wealth to 'the people' who Trump repeatedly assures his public have been abused by such deals and alliances for decades.

Recently, in talking about Montenegro's membership of NATO, Trump expressed disbelief that due to the common defence principle if the country were to 'get aggressive' then the US would be drawn into 'World War III" (Stacey, 2018). This displays not only a basic misunderstanding of how the common defence principle functions (it is not relevant if a NATO member is the aggressor) but that Trump is increasingly unwilling to be involved in common defence when it is not Americans that are at risk. This may seem sensible, but it is dangerous rhetoric that plays right into the hands of nations such as Russia and China who would welcome a decline of NATO's unity and power. There has even been suggestion that Trump's comments about Montenegro play right into a Russian ploy (ibid.), as without US support it would be difficult for the remaining European

alliance members to respond to an attack on the country from Russia. This could leave eastern Europe open to Russian aggression which would impart tremendous moral damage on NATO. At a time when countries such as Hungary, Poland, Turkey and even Germany are seeing a rise in the popularity of populists hostile to NATO, Trump's position is dangerous not only for the stability of the alliance, but for peace and security in Europe.

Threat to the alliance from Europe
While the threat to NATO from the US is certainly pressing, the threat coming from inside Europe itself is perhaps far more existential. To understand this, it is necessary to understand what has given the alliance its longevity, allowing it to survive even when its original reason for existing has disappeared. Initially, NATO's cohesion rested on the common threat of the Soviet Union, being formed in order to provide an effective counter to the Soviet Bloc. However, even then it was more unified than the majority of multilateral institutions due to the common character of its members (Wallander 2018). These early members were almost all liberal democracies who were 'accountable to their citizens, bound by the rule of law, and dedicated to upholding political and civil rights'(ibid.). It is true that in the very early days of NATO it was less squeamish about democratic values, Portugal under the authoritarian dictator Salazar being a founding member, but this was largely because in the initial post – Second World War years 'strategic necessity trumped values' (Biscop 2018, 2), and the alliance could not afford to turn away potential members due to moral scruples.

However, this changed as democracy *became* a strategic necessity, and the consolidation of democracy in central and Eastern Europe a key objective of NATO enlargement (ibid.), showed by the stringent requirements regarding democracy and civilian control of the military that those included in the first and second wave of NATO enlargement had to meet (Edmunds 2003, 146). Currently, democratic governance and strong institutions are just as much of a cornerstone of the Alliance as is collective defence, which is stressed by Article II of the Treaty (Antunéz, 2018). Institutionalists, argue that it was by virtue of the norms and sense of collective identity that the alliance embodied that it was able to survive the end of the Cold War (Gheciu 2005, 975; Risse – Kappen 1995), with NATO

being more than simply a military alliance due to its ability to 'socialise' potential an new members into the ways of being a liberal democratic state.

Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become an alliance dedicated not just to protecting the territorial integrity of its members, but also to preserving and advancing the model of society and governance employed by its members – liberal democracy (Wallander 2018). The rhetoric and policies of the populist parties gaining greater influence across the continent directly challenge this method of governance, at the same time challenging the existence of NATO itself. These parties have been explicitly hostile to NATO, seeing it as being yet another manifestation of rule by the elites at the expense of 'the people', and it seems that if these parties were to gain greater power, either through increasing representation in the legislature or outright control over governments, then NATO could be directly threatened.

Today, both the fringe parties and the governments of Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Poland are weakening democracy in their countries, and it seems as if the common purpose that has kept NATO together since the 1990s is being undermined, with the more authoritarian and antidemocratic a government becomes, the more it brings the bonds of solidarity behind the Alliance into question. Among NATO members it has become understood that the purpose of the state is to guarantee 'security, prosperity and democracy' (Biscop 2018, 1-4) for its citizens, with it being increasingly impossible for that triad to be disentangled (ibid.). The importance of democratic values to NATO is exemplified by the lengthy joining processes that countries formerly under authoritarian rule have faced, Montenegro for example taking ten years to earn its admission (Wallander 2018). This rigorous process has slowed expansion, but shows how seriously the alliance has taken democracy, seeing it as a non–negotiable and central condition for membership.

By attacking democracy, Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán and his fellow populists threaten to compromise this triad, making NATO's existence ever more untenable. In Orban's famous 'illiberal democracies' speech in 2014 he stated outright that he believes the key to success is to turn to a system that is not liberal, not a liberal democracy, and

perhaps not even a democracy (Freedom House 2018). This is coupled with rhetoric that is ever more overtly hostile to NATO and similar institutions. For example, Orbán stated in February that he feels Hungary should not have to depend on NATO for protection but should be able to defend itself from 'any direction' (Bayer 2019) without relying on the principles of common defence.

This is not only a Hungarian problem, with Poland in particular also engaging in what has been termed democratic 'backsliding'. Since Poland's Law and Justice party took power in 2015, they have been slowly eroding the key protections and institutions that have made Poland a bastion of democracy since the Second World War. Most recently, the government passed a law making it a crime to claim that Poland was complicit in the Holocaust (Wallander 2018), rewriting history and making it ever more difficult for citizens to hold their government accountable. Poland and Hungary might be celebrating twenty years of membership in NATO this year, but unless there is a major shift in their domestic politics it appears that they will both mark this anniversary by undermining the shared values and commitments that have kept the alliance strong throughout this crucial period. NATO, despite its flaws, has succeeded in preventing the vast majority of conflict within Europe, and without it, it seems this peace may end.

If NATO was to collapse or be weakened, what could this mean for security in Europe?
Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has remained relatively peaceful, with conflicts within the region becoming increasingly rare. While this is at least in part due to the economic interdependence encouraged by the European Union, the common defence principle enshrined in Article Five of the Washington Treaty plus a shared understanding that military actions are a last resort, has aided this state of affairs. If NATO was to be weakened, or even to collapse, the consequences could potentially be severe. The most pressing potential consequences seem to be threefold.

Firstly, it seems entirely possible that a breakdown of NATO could lead to a resurgence of inter-state conflict in Europe, particularly since the EU is experiencing a turbulent period and many nations are dissatisfied with current agreements concerning the refugee crisis. Since the inception of NATO, the shared commitment to democratic values, and the

principal of common defence has engendered a situation where conflict between European states seems almost impossible. In a situation where several key European countries have turned away from democracy and where NATO is no longer a unifying force, conflict would no longer seem so unthinkable. The link between democratic governance and lack of conflict has been long established (Albright and Jomaa 2017, 4) and research has shown that 'hybrid regimes' with mixed features of democracy and autocracy plus weak democratic institutions are the most likely to spawn insecurity and conflict (ibid., 2). This is the state of being that democratic 'backsliding' countries such as Poland and Hungary appear to be moving towards, and it seems clear than in a situation where populism has led democracy in Europe to fail and NATO no longer acts as a restraining force, conflict could be an inevitable response

Secondly, disunity in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, leaves open avenues of influence for a resurgent Russia which seems increasingly interested in extending its influence further over the continent. One of NATO's major purposes during the Cold War was to balance against the Soviet Union, and since the *end* of this conflict, it's purpose has become to extend its influence over former Soviet Bloc countries such as Hungary. A weakening of NATO's power and influence would provide the opportunity for a newly expansionist Russia to exercise its influence over its former vassal states once more. In recent years many have suggested that NATO expansion is viewed very differently in Russia, where it is seen not as extending the reach of democracy but as threatening Russia's integrity (Sten 2018). Therefore, any weakness shown by NATO is highly likely to be taken as an opportunity for Russia to reclaim the traditional buffer zone between it and the West.

Finally, if NATO were to collapse, or even to be weakened significantly, then the fate of its current operations would be in doubt, which could be devastating not just for Europe's security but that of the world. More than 20,000 NATO troops are currently engaged in operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, Iraq, and Somalia (NATO 2018), and these missions, the majority of which largely involve peacekeeping, would face an uncertain future if NATO was no longer able to provide these forces. The African Union has made great strides in its peacekeeper provision, African countries now providing 50%

of all UN peacekeepers (de Coning, 2017), but this is not the case for the majority of the places where NATO troops are currently stationed. In this way, the wave of instability that such an event could cause in Europe would be likely to ripple out across the world

Conclusion

It seems clear that the threats from populism to NATO are potentially severe, with what has become the very basis of the alliance over the past three decades being undermined both by the US and from inside Europe. While it is true that President Trump's ultimate threat of withdrawing from NATO is unlikely to actually take place due to overwhelming bipartisan opposition, even his rhetoric concerning the alliance and his move towards bilateral deals with allies could be enough to significantly weaken NATO. Similarly, while it seems extremely unlikely for any European country to actively withdraw from NATO, construction of bilateral security deals such as Poland's with the US, coupled with democratic backsliding in multiple countries, are beginning to undermine the alliance from within. If this continues, then there is a very real possibility that the alliance in its current form could cease to exist. This would leave a power vacuum which could be easily exploited by those long opposed to the liberal democratic order, in turn leading to a degree of instability that Europe has not experienced in decades.

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Look Beyond 'Populism'

Teoman Kucuk

> *[T]hey treat rights as an impediment to their conception of the majority will… they privilege the declared interests of the majority… They scapegoat refugees, immigrant communities, and minorities… it is only a matter of time before they turn on those who disagree with their agenda.* (Roth 2016)

These words of warning were written by Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of the international NGO Human Rights Watch, in a 2016 publication titled 'The Dangerous Rise of Populism'. This kind of alarmism may sound somewhat familiar two and a half years on, and one might start wondering what this global 'rise' of populism really means, and what we should do about it.

In this article I will argue that populism is not a problem all its own, nor just an indicator of some discontent. Rather, it is a term given to a number of political movements claiming to address widespread, systematic grievances. The endemic nature of such movements should demonstrate to us that the issues at hand are global, systemic, and require radically new solutions. It is in searching for these solutions, not combatting populism, that the real challenge of our generation lies. Looking to go back to the 'good old days' or just wait until this 'crazy' politics goes away is not going to cut it.

The Dangers of Democracy

Before we get there, however, what is it about populism that has attracted so much attention and, specifically, concern? As the quote above by Roth illustrates, part of the worry is that 'populism' endangers the institutions and systems we have today. One strand of the literature which examines exactly *how* this occurs is democratic deconsolidation theory, spearheaded in part by authors Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa. Starting with an article in 2016 called 'The Democratic Disconnect', they have argued that in addition to democratic consolidation, the process through which young democracies mature and become the only game in town, democracies can also *deconsolidate*, losing institutional and systemic legitimacy and becoming vulnerable to

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violation (Foa and Mounk 2016, 15). Populism, for them, is one of the number of movements causing such striking deconsolidation in democracies worldwide; a deconsolidation which they demonstrate not only through case studies of the erosion of the rule of law, but also through surveys demonstrating falling public opinion of key liberal democratic institutions and values.

For Mounk and Foa, this development is alarming. They write that 'The power now wielded by antisystem parties and movements is unprecedented. So is the deep disenchantment with democracy they exploit so shrewdly.'(Foa and Mounk 2017) Citizens who don't want to lose their democracies, then, should 'defend' it against 'attacks' from such movements, before it is too late. Otherwise, they warn, this development may 'one day be seen as the beginning of the end for liberal democracy' (Foa and Mounk 2017, 14).

Yet Mounk and Foa, along with other authors in conversation with them[1], do not exclusively lean on the term 'populism', utilising other words like 'antisystem' (Foa and Mounk 2016, 15) and 'illiberal' (Foa and Mounk 2016, 13) alongside them. The range of threat, then, is wider and less defined for this literature, in part because 'populism' on its own is not so certain and analytically useful a word as its widespread usage may make it seem.

Know thy Enemy?
And so perhaps it is useful now to look a little closer at the term, and lend an ear to some more rigorous and thoughtful dealings with the topic. In recent publications dealing with the wave of electoral successes by non-liberal parties, the literature is diverse. One part of this discussion includes scholars like Jan-Werner Muller and Cas Mudde, whose investigations on pluralism go well beyond sensational panic or moralising and predate much of that kind of response as well.

In a 2014 article, Muller tries to parse through different conceptions of populism, hoping to understand the right frame of mind through which a more useful definition of the term

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[1] A portion of the discourse over democratic deconsolidation is centred on the *Journal of Democracy*, and includes authors such as Paul Howe, Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf, Ghia Nodia, and Steven Levitsky.

might be found. He argues that populism shouldn't be seen as the politics of a certain social base, a fixed ideology with coherent and certain policy goals or an emotional pathology. For Muller, populism represents 'a particular moralistic imagination of politics', one which pits a pure and righteous 'people' against a corrupted and impure 'elite', who in right-wing varieties ally themselves with 'marginal groups that do not really belong either' (Muller 2014, 485). The core task and practice of populists for Muller, then, is conjuring up an imagined majority and a true 'people' from within the *actual* relevant, citizen population.

Cas Mudde echoed (or rather anticipated) this sentiment when he wrote in 2004 that populism is 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people' (Mudde 2004, 543). Mudde has been an active commentator on populism in broader media as well, writing primarily in *The Guardian* where he is a columnist. In one of his contributions to the population detailing 'five things you need to know' about populism, he pointed out that 'populism is an illiberal democratic response to democratic illiberalism' (Mudde 2017).

As this point should demonstrate, these authors are not unwilling to search for the root causes of the supposed populist upsurge, or afraid to heap blame on establishment positions and practices in such a search. Muller emphasises that the rise of populism in Europe can be linked to the continent's post-war statecraft strategies, particularly in its balancing of elected and unelected bodies. Wary of the horrors brought about in part through demagoguery in the interwar period, European lawmakers and political elites attempted to construct states immune to this. Muller argues that this left a Europe with 'distrust of unrestrained popular sovereignty… in the very DNA of post-war European politics' (Muller 2014, 490). Carried through into the construction of the EEC and EU, then, this set up a clear flashpoint for popular contention- one which was, according to Muller, exacerbated by technocratic responses to subsequent crises which further distanced the populace from any real decision-making. Mudde strikes a similarly sympathetic tone, writing that 'Populist parties are not the cause of most political dissatisfaction within

western democracies, they are the consequence of it' (Mudde 2017). For these authors, then, populism is an *indicator* of problems at least as much as it is one itself.

Don't Hate the Player

Now, as unfair as it is to ask for clear policy suggestions from academics, we can still wonder at this juncture what these authors suggest thoughtful citizens and active political figures should do considering the situation we have found ourselves in. And this, unfortunately, is where the limitations of the preceding discourse are most prominently seen. Despite recognition that populism is not an independent menace, an aberration from the political situation which must be dealt with on its own, nevertheless the above discussion has sought to define it as a unique political phenomenon, and in largely *negative* terms. What I mean by this is that, instead of conceptualising the issue at hand in reference to the forces which give rise to it, authors like Mounk, Muller and Mudde seem more intent on *defining the enemy*. As such, when it comes to the point of dealing with the situation, the language becomes one of 'defeating populists' (Mudde 2018), 'defending' against attacks (Foa and Mounk 2017, 14), or what ''we' - good liberal democrats that we are - should do.' (Muller 2014, 484). Indeed, actual concrete suggestions go as far as defending forms of militant democracy. Muller argues in a 2015 article that the European Union should respond to the populist threat by carrying out sanctions against such parties, writing that the alternative would be a 'cowardly, creeping cynicism that would slowly erode the Union as a whole from within' (Muller 2015, 160). In other words, Muller is arguing for an understanding of liberal democracy which *precludes the legitimacy of certain parties from competing*, something that he explicitly claims is one of the distasteful characteristics of populism itself (Muller 2014, 487).

These suggestions betray the central limitation of such approaches to 'populism': they suffer from ideological inertia. What I mean by this is that such approaches start from a largely settled ideological perspective, and seek to make sense of the phenomena at hand as *external* to that perspective and its prescriptions. If populism is a sign of problems, then it is also a proposed *answer* to these problems. Therefore, we must compete in answering the questions themselves, exposing ideology to question as much as practice; it is reflection we need, not orthodoxy. Muller's defence of militant democracy and Mudde's

proposal to 'explain' to populists why their 'visions are either amoral or unrealistic' (Mudde 2018) demonstrate this ideological certainty, and yet it is exactly on this point that difference is necessary, for a number of reasons.

First, on the issue of the emergence of less palatable critical movements which emphasise the 'true' people, emerging particularly from the right, we need to recognise that such arguments are not external to the structures and values that make up states today, but inhere in them. Regardless of whether this is convenient to recognise, it is nevertheless true that most nation states have a strong ethnic element in their narratives of composition. United by common religion, history, beliefs, practices, language, or most broadly, *culture*, the 'nation' of a nation-state thus often incorporates elements that exclude others based on such grounds[2]. It should not, then, be a surprise that in a world of growing multiculturalism and plurality, this conception cannot be easily accommodated. That is, taking this element of the nation-state's composition seriously, rather than as ritual words to be spoken but not expanded, it is fairly easy to approach conceptions approximating fascism. Whether in biased educational systems (Kumar 2014), or unchallenged national narratives (EDAM 2015), it is clear to see how fascistic interpretations of 'the people' are, although non-essential, a fully plausible conclusion to be drawn from the condition of the nation-state. Simply 'explaining' why such conclusions are wrong is a failure to address the assumptions and contradictions lying at the base of our structures which generate tendency towards such dangerous ideologies.

Second, to differentiate those fighting, in some sense, *outside* the extant procedures as being the dangerous and illegitimate parties is an incomplete imagination of what the substantial realisation of Muller's own point of the 'new social contract' (Muller 2014, 491) would entail. Stepping out of characterising a pathological 'populist imaginary' (Muller 2014, 486), and taking seriously for a second the alleged grievances of those supporting such movements, we can ask how a group *can and should* go about reforming a system whose structure is *designed* to be more accessible to certain elites and *designed* to promote and maintain their interests. Although fully procedurally sound pathways to reform are not impossible in such a scenario, they have the chance of being *highly unlikely*. If groups

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[2] For further treatment of this, see *Imagined Communities* by Benedict Anderson (1991).

believe this to be the case for their state systems, political actors are incentivised to circumvent the disabling procedural rules which are, by such measures, illegitimate themselves, and voters are incentivised to encourage such behaviour[3]. Indeed, the point that such groups are more likely to favour short-circuits than other parties (presumably those more in line with the status quo), can also be partly attributed to the latter's greater affinity for *inertia*; that is, inaction better suits the goals of those with warmer feelings towards the status quo, as this can mean their preservation. Those happy with where they are will complain less when nothing changes.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, these understandings are incomplete in that they limit the scope of so-called populist movements to the national stage on which elections occur. Certainly, domestic-level structures and phenomena form a large part of the problems that generate populist and anti-system movements, and starting one's solutions at home is always sound advice. However, cases like that of Greece (BBC 2015) illustrate that recalibration on that level will not only be insufficient in addressing the problems at hand, but will also be made more difficult by international conditions. Whether the question is of businesses and investment that will flee in the face of stricter regulation and more progressive taxation, international competition and trade laws that will crush indigenous industrial projects, linkages to foreign currencies which will undermine independent monetary policy, prior military and financial commitments which will perpetuate old policy, or an inter*national* system which in its language and conceptualisation can arguably channel concerns into packages defined by national identity[4]; people are not entirely free to solve their problems at home. Really, part of this is that the problems are *not* 'at home' but are part of wider networks of issues whose full resolution does not fit into any single nation-state.

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[3] A possible example for this is the fate of the military tutelary system in Turkey, ostensibly constructed to safeguard the constitution and functioning through military coups. The legal apparatuses upholding the structure were dismantled by the AKP through referenda, yet dubious charges brought against top military officials, some now overturned, were utilised in the process. For more information, see Koray Caliskan's, 'Explaining the end of military tutelary regime and the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey' (2017)

[4] For examples of this, see nation-building projects by the Ottoman Empire and its successor states, and Japan in the 19th- early 20th centuries. Andrew Linklater covers how these projects fit in with attempts to integrate into the international system in his article 'The 'Standard of Civilisation' in World Politics'.

The most prominent example of this in the West is the outsourcing of labour-intensive work to lower income countries. To simply block such outsourcing would be to ignore the economic structure which incentivises such activity- essentially a stopgap measure which actors will have incentive to remove. Protectionist measures by President Trump (White House 2018) and suggestions by presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (Sanders 2016) seek to prevent such outsourcing, hoping that this will 'bring back jobs', so to speak. Measures such as these, as well as calls to limit immigration, in order to increase jobs at home would work if given a static world system outside of national borders. Nuance is necessary, however, when the massive interconnectedness of markets and national economies means that such shifts will not only create reverberations worldwide, but are *predicated* on the wealth and business generated through global economic interdependence.

A World of Problems

It is also important not only to see how these Western issues tie in with the rest of the world, but to actually take a more global perspective as well. For example, while in the last 20 years real wages in advanced G20 economies have increased by a mere nine per cent on average, developing and emerging G20 economies recorded a tripling of this same figure (ILO 2018). The fact that, despite this, populism and anti-system sentiment are in no way foreign to such economies (as visible with, say, the AKP in Turkey and the BJP in India) should tell us a number of things.

First, that the issue is global. The rise of groups unhappy with the status quo in a limited number of states clustered within a specific region like Western Europe would merit explanations that were similarly parochial; racist undercurrents in the culture coming to the fore, a local economic downturn leading to discontent, etc. However, the fact that this is a truly global phenomenon (Foa and Mounk 2017, 5) should lead us to look for global answers and hold at least a certain suspicion towards global systems and practices.

Second, that the grievances at the heart of the issue are systemic. There are only so many random events that can coincidentally occur at once, and only so many surface-level explanations that can have so broad an impact. Viewing the recent developments as an aberration and hoping to roll back the clock to prevent so-called populism from arising, is

to discount the possibility that the structures themselves lead to certain conflicts and contradictions when played out, and that resolution of these can only be delayed through elimination of their indicators. The rapid increase of global inequality over the past few decades, a point of popular contention (Mounk, 101), is not an unusual development in a free market, global economy. Although we are approaching it, the economic inequality we face today is still not at the same levels as the Gilded Age or, as Thomas Piketty calls it, the *Belle Epoque* (Piketty, 195-196). Such developments are not unforeseen and easily avoidable side-effects, but consequences of the system as is.

Finally, new solutions are required for the problems at hand. The issues cannot be expected to disappear through soldiering through them with the same playbook, hoping that they will passively dissipate as the system absorbs and integrates them eventually. In a world where 'peoples' are represented through states formed by their collective 'self-determination' (U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2), which both allowed for the independence of certain states in the era of decolonisation and now remains a contentious issue in battles for secession worldwide, the evaporation of identity, particularly ethnic identity tied to the 'nation' of a nation-state, is nigh on inconceivable. Within structures and narratives so conceived, the possibility of nativism rising in salience is one that can never be discounted. Full address of such issues would require radical changes to the underlying structure, not vague promises to make it work in a more diverse world.

Given *international inequality* in living conditions and wages are in part the source of flashpoints for populists like economic immigration and outsourcing of jobs, it seems like some resolution on that front could alleviate the worries raised by our problem, and one might be tempted to think this is already underway (Krugman 1997). Yet hopes that entrenching the current system just a little bit more will solve problems is not only economically dubious (World Bank 2015), but also environmentally untenable. In a world of growing concerns over climate change, equalising the development and living standards in countries around the world using the same types of industry and economic models as we have today is a certain path to ecological and climate disaster. The energy usage of those in developed countries, for example, is far higher than those in the developing world, with energy consumption of the average American in 2014 being more

than ten times that of India, as are CO$_2$ emissions per capita (World Bank 2018). Without fundamentally changing energy industries and developmental infrastructure, development abroad may just mean repeating the catastrophic degradation of our environment many times over.

The upshot of all of this is that we have a lot of work ahead of us, and none of it is easy. Focusing on the proliferation of dissenting, anti-establishment parties is, in this sense, a mere distraction. Dangerous, in that it can both cause direct harm if acted on, and indirect harm in keeping us away from the real problems at hand; but a distraction, nonetheless.

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To What Extent Can Populism Delegitimise Global Governance? China and America's Response

Karen Katiyo

Introduction

Warnings about the crises in the liberal global political order have increased over recent years (see Roubini 2017; Kaplan 2017). Indeed, rising trends in protectionism, nationalism, and populism, in particular, have encumbered the political and operational capacities of established global governance institutions. This can, and does, detrimentally affect overall international commitments to global public policy, especially global economic cooperation. This paper examines populism and global governance with two aims in mind. First, to explore whether ideology in national political discourse can delegitimise global economic institutions. Second, to briefly consider and theorise the Peoples Republic of China's (China) response to that of the United States of America (U.S.). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the anchor chosen for contextual analysis and contrasts will be drawn between the two countries. It will be concluded that although populism may have a delegitimising effect on global governance, it is unlikely to cause fatal harm to global economic governance at the present. Furthermore, although China and the U.S. currently hold distinctly opposing positions, it is unlikely to significantly shift the balance of power between them.

First, the paper observes the current structuring of the IMF, chosen due to its visibility in global affairs as well as its inherently political nature (McNeil and Morten 2004). Despite its founding on the logic that technical economic questions can be separated from politics, the IMF is a state-sponsored institution. Therefore, the materiality of populism in the wider discussion of global governance becomes more apparent once understood in the context that significant threats to global economic governance structures are largely driven by the *politico*-economic factors of states rather than purely economic determinants. Thereafter, contemporary approaches to the IMF will be examined beginning with the U.S. and its current attitude towards multilateral institutional cooperation. This will be compared with China's new identity as an institution-builder that is increasingly proactive in the global order. Speculative consideration will be made as to the sustainability of

global economic institutions lacking a U.S. multilateral consensus, and the viability of China successfully assuming leadership in such institutions.

Working Definitions

This paper adopts the following interpretations of key concepts. Global governance refers to a multi-dimensional framework in which collective efforts are made to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014). Global economic governance institutions are multilateral organisations (predominantly in trade and finance) whose common objectives lie in providing effective and efficient allocation of resources in as representative and accountable a number as possible (Higgott 2017). Delegitimization is assigned its ordinary and natural meaning of diminishing, undermining or destabilising the authority of something. Finally, populism encompasses a range of political, socio-cultural and economic approaches which rely on the distinction between a pure and sovereign people, on the one hand, and a corrupt and unresponsive political elite on the other (Higgott 2017). Most contemporary commentators agree it commonly encompasses a form of 'anti-establishment orientation and opposition to liberal economics and globalisation' (Judis 2016). This paper favours the latter description as it establishes a developing connection between the emergence of populist politics and the destabilising of core assumptions about global governance in general.

The International Monetary Fund

Alongside the World Bank (WB), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – later the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – the IMF was established at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. It is a lender of last resorts and works to 'foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth' through the provision of short-term loans for balance-of-payments deficits (IMF 2019). It currently has 189 member states who provide around one trillion U.S. dollars' worth of funding through individual and collective borrowing arrangements as well as permanent quotas based on the size of the individual countries' economy. The quota contributed by member states serves as the basis for determining how much a member state can borrow or receive in periodic allocations.

With that said, it is important to remember that by being 'accountable to its member country governments', decisions within the IMF are taken by national authorities in light of their own national interests –only after which is a consensus then sought (Ibid). The IMF is therefore acutely susceptible to changes in the political agenda of the most influential states (that is the most advanced economies), as its policies ultimately depend on the contributions from its largest shareholders (Copelovitch 2010).

It has been suggested the balance of power today in the major global institutions still largely represents the (modified) balance of power from 1944 to 1945 (Higgott 2012). The veto-holding, 'permanent five' on the United Nations Security Council still are the victors of World War II. Granted, present-day China is a less pro-Western realisation than had been hoped for post-1945 and Russia occupies the seat created for the Soviet Union (USSR). Similarly, the IMF has been described as having a 'Washington-centric approval culture' (Nielson et al 2006, 109). Despite the realignment of voting patterns and changes in global economic decision-making, the IMF arguably still carries and reflects the power secured by the United States in return for underwriting the post-World War II economic recovery in Europe (Ikenberry 2001).

America First…

The U.S. is the world's foremost economic power and it currently commits 164 billion U.S. dollars to the IMF on a permanent basis (Congressional Budget Office, 2016). It is the largest 'shareholder' and as such has both the largest subscription of IMF resources and largest voting share (16.5% as of 2019), as it has done since its inception (Ainley 1979). The 57 billion-dollar loan to Argentina was the biggest in IMF history and notably supported by the U.S., yet the strong and ongoing scepticism of the current administration in regard to multilateralism raises questions about the future of such global economic governance institutions.

Since World War II, unprecedented levels of emerging populist and nationalist policies in the U.S., and many other European countries, have replaced economic pragmatism with 'culture wars' (Higgott 2017, 5).[1] Particularly in the U.S., this appears to have moved

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[1] Refers to political discourse guided more by emotionally charged values.

upwards from a populist presidential campaign to nationalism beyond domestic policies characterised by a mistrust of multilateral institutions. Led by President Donald Trump's 'America First' ideology, the U.S. has reneged on multilateral arrangements and has since been labelled as 'anti-globalisation' and thus 'anti-multilateralism'. This appears largely substantiated by America's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017; the unyielding renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement to the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA[2]), and the controversial withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2017 (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2018).

Some populist misgivings about globalisation, however, are not without some merit. For example, participation within multilateral institutions can constrain a state's sovereignty and decision-making abilities. This can be seen in institutions such as the European Union (E.U.) where tariffs on goods within the Union are set and binding on member states. However, populism can contribute to the weakening of domestic and global growth through protectionist barriers to opportunities such as trade. Multilateralism does not end at just the financing of investments. It is also key in developing and maintaining fair global economic and social relations among states. It establishes networks to create, collect, and exchange knowledge. It is also about resolving potential conflicts among partners and competitors for global resources, markets, and influence (Linn, 2018, 86). States that reject multilateralism may miss out on these benefits and see their industries shrink back to their domestic economies.

It could be contended that Trump's populist tendencies and actions have largely been rhetorical in the economic and foreign policy domain (Boot 2017). Therefore, the delegitimising impact of populism in institutions such as the IMF is either justifiable or unfounded. Nevertheless, as populism is, by nature, antagonistic to globalisation, it can and does fundamentally undermine systems of economic governance. This is because, 'the stronger the nationalistic and populist pressures at home, the less likely it is a government will support multilateral development funding mechanisms' (Linn 2018, 90). The

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[2] Under the threat of the U.S.'s departure. It has been signed by all three States in November 2018 but is as yet ratified by the U.S. Congress.

following paragraphs explore further why Trump's populist approach, in particular, can be argued to undermine the global multilateral consensus.

A significant and immediate threat to global governance institutions at large is the possible withdrawal of the U.S. from its traditional leadership role in supporting multilateral approaches to global challenges. On the face of it, there may appear to be a lack of common ground between multilateralism and populism. However, while the populist-inspired 'America First' policy may not necessarily translate to America alone, it does suggest current U.S. policy is less inclined to positively support a 'wider global order underwritten by a network of multilateral institutions' (Higgott 2017, 9). Whereas in the past, America supported the strengthening of global and regional institutions, it is now favouring a more 'transactional' approach involving bilateral deals and solutions. This can significantly slow global trade growth and escalate world-wide anti-free-trade rhetoric. This is because the U.S.'s economic power and influence which has allowed it to determine the global economy, trade, and the political order for over the past 70 years, will continue to do so now (Zhang et al 2018, 1). The possibility of populism delegitimising global economic governance is a valid concern as America's involvement in multilateral cooperation is crucial to global stability. At present, its approach needs to appeal not only to President Trump's own 'instinctive-classical mercantilist' view of the world', but also the political base that voted him into office (Woolcock, 2018); a populist base opposed to liberal economics and globalisation.

Historically, the U.S. Congress has appeared reluctant to support the IMF, with lawmakers often questioning the need to finance other countries. The last request of the IMF's quota was only approved in late 2015 after a contentious five-year debate in Congress. That continuing rhetoric or reluctance, even if previously relegated to America's long-standing isolationist tendencies, is argued to now be due to current populist pressures connected with balancing domestic needs versus international development. For example, Trump's budget request for 2018 proposed sharp reductions in support for the United Nations, the WB, and other multilateral development banks (Office of Management and Budget, 2018). It would not be entirely baseless to suggest this is because of the administration's narrower focus on bilateral agreements coloured by populist-tinged protectionist policies.

A focus significantly aided by the asymmetrical advantage the U.S. possesses due to its relatively larger size and wealth in comparison with other states. This preference continues to be expressed through the continued resistance to increase the IMF's permanent capital funding levels (Mnuchin 2018). Reasons cited by the U.S. Treasury undersecretary, David Malpass, include that the U.S is 'opposed to changes in quotas, given that the IMF has ample resources to achieve its mission' and 'countries have considerable alternative resources to draw upon in the event of a crisis' (Politi and Fleming 2018). Given the large role that U.S. engagement has traditionally played, such retreat from development and multilateral assistance is particularly concerning as the IMF and other global economic institutions' core funding models are based on the principle of equitable burden sharing among member countries.

...China for All?

That being said, it is suggested that the U.S. withdrawing from multilateral arrangements has opened up strategic space for China to assume a more proactive role. Granted, while it would be misplaced to paint China as a beacon of resistance against the 'negative' effects of populism, it is important to note the implications of China's growing institutional power; rising engagement in international institutions and pursuit of leadership in global financial governance (Olson and Prestowitz 2011). Its current narrative generally champions economic globalisation against protectionist and isolationist policies. As a matter of fact, China has provided numerous loans to states from its many lending institutions, especially those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[3] and cemented its position as a major provider of development assistance in Africa (Trueman 2018). Leading expert on U.S.-China economic relations David Dollar predicts that, as a significant global investor, China is on the path to becoming the world's largest net creditor around 2020 (2016, 1). What makes China an interesting comparative case study, in this case, is not necessarily an explicit link to populism itself, but rather how its global policies effectively counter it. China appears to be viewed by the U.S. as unfairly – through globalisation – penetrating domestic industries, stealing Western technology and thus robbing the U.S. of jobs. America's reaction to it through trade wars has displayed

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[3] The BRI is a new global architecture designed by China to frame its new role as a leading world power through the consolidation and upgrade of a dense network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) into a multilateral arrangement.

retaliatory behaviour shrouded in an 'us versus them' mentality. This is a hallmark of classic populist ideology merely projected onto the international stage.

While China's voting share and decision-making capabilities in the IMF fall behind that of Japan[4], and significantly behind that of the U.S., it has managed to demonstrate an ability to successfully lead economic institutions without an American multilateral consensus. This is evident in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) where it holds the largest total voting share of 26.8%. Described as the 'Beijing Woods' by one commentator, the AIIB is a sizeable institution boasting 44 non-regional members, 26 non-regional members, and 23 prospective members as of April 2019 ((Leong 2015; AIIB 2019). It seeks to fill the development gap left by multilateral development banks that have begun to shift funding from infrastructure to social development and poverty alleviation in the region. The joining of key states, particularly U.S. allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom (U.K.), has granted greater legitimacy to China's institutional power and potential for leadership in global economic governance.

Analysis

Though the IMF and the AIIB pursue different objectives, China's capacity to instigate and then institutionalise change in the latter could be indicative of its ability to do the same in the former in its fight against exclusivity and protectionism in a U.S. led global order (Pekkanen 2016, 228). Nevertheless, U.S. participation and leadership in the IMF is more or less secure, at least for the foreseeable future. Bøås and McNeil (2003) note the U.S. is incentivised by the strategic, economic and political influence it can exert and benefit from in IMF membership and leadership (35). A 2005, quantitative study even revealed a correlative relationship between IMF lending and states' voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly and the levels of U.S. aid to the borrowing country (Vreeland 2005).

Furthermore, China's interactions with the IMF have been variable and guided by its own distinct objectives. Where China has diverging interests, its collaborative spirit is 'less pleasant' and unsupportive (Wang 2017, 66). For example, China recently pursued reform

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[4] Japan has a 6.15% voting share compared to China's 6.09% share and the U.S.'s 16.52% share (IMF).

within the IMF by questioning, alongside other BRIC economies[5], the sustainability, and legitimacy of a U.S. dollar-dominated international monetary system. However, this also served the dual purpose of furthering China's Renminbi (RBM)[6] internationalisation strategy. This was ultimately realised when the RBM was added to the Special Drawing Rights[7] in 2016. The IMF's interests were also met as it gained 'global legitimacy from giving a leading role to Beijing' (Donnah and Anderlini 2015). However, on the other hand, significant deterioration of the IMF-China relationship took place during the second half of the 2000s. The two battled over China's 'problematic' exchange rates, which the IMF's country surveillance alleged was undervalued and lacked transparency (Huang 2018). This occasion indicated any divergences in Chinese-IMF objectives fundamentally hinders collaboration between the two. Thus, a pattern of habitual withdrawal of support casts doubt on China as a future, stable and dependable primary IMF sponsor.

Perhaps most importantly, is the notion that the question of leadership and power in international relations is particularly complex. Power does not automatically translate into influence, and that in turn does not automatically turn into leadership. Audience, membership and legitimacy matter. For example, the State of Southeast Asia 2019 survey carried out by the ISEAS[8] Yusof Ishak Institute reveals 61.4% of the Southeast Asian respondents overwhelmingly regard China as the most economically, strategically and politically influential power likely to 'provide alternative regional leadership in the wake of perceived U.S. disengagement' (ISEAS 2019). The survey assesses the views of over 1,000 Southeast Asians on the region's strategic and economic situation, as well as views on major power engagement in the region. It also revealed China to be the least trusted power with only 8.9% of the respondents viewing it as a 'benign and benevolent power' (ISEAS 2019, 18). This suggests China's leadership in both regional and global economic governance will depend significantly on legitimation by other powers acquiescing to its leadership. Furthermore, as mentioned, the U.S. is ultimately the world's foremost economic and influential power. Despite its 'retreat' from multilateralism, it still is a major

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[5] BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China; countries deemed to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development.
[6] The official currency of China.
[7] An international reserve asset to supplement its member states' official money reserves. Neither a currency nor a claim on the IMF itself but a potential claim against the currencies of IMF members.
[8] Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

participant in global economic institutions. With that said, the AIIB and other initiatives led by China do reflect the emergence of a functional and arguably effective institutional order that is not 'U.S.-led'. Such supplementary or parallel institutions signal a systematic realignment and reshaping of an international order that can possibly shield multilateralism from populist destabilisation.

Conclusion

To conclude, populism's nature being antithetical to multilateral cooperation does raise legitimate concerns for global governance. However, the analysis presented here must be understood in a wider context. Firstly, the political and economic dimensions are not always aligned. A regime can be populist in the political domain without rejecting liberal economics. Secondly, other major economies, such as some E.U. member states (notably Germany), have not shown any inclination to follow a protectionist and anti-globalisation lead. In fact, the U.K.'s 'Brexit' continues to show that attempts by a state to extricate itself from, and incidentally delegitimise in doing so, a multilateral institution, will be met unsympathetically by the majority of member states (Khalaf 2018). Thirdly, national political trends like nationalism and populism are cyclical. Anti-E.U. sentiments in continental Europe seem to have waned following Brexit, and the radical nature of the anti-globalism of the Trump administration may end up similarly suffering a similar backlash that will eventually lead to a future return to pro-globalisation policies (Linn 2018, 94). Therefore, if the U.S.'s rejection of multilateralism is relatively short-term, it will likely not make any lasting damage to the fabric of the multilateral trade system.

Overall, the IMF does not appear to be in particularly imminent or mortal danger from the current populism rhetoric of the U.S. Granted, nationalist foreign policies influenced by anti-globalisation or anti-multilateral ideologies may affect funding commitments and thus weaken the sustainability and strength of the institution. Nevertheless, the IMF and other global economic institutions are unlikely to embrace protectionism as a way to deal with the disruptive effects of globalisation. Furthermore, in a competitive and shifting international order, other powers are willing to either set up alternative institutions as done by China or occupy vacuums of influence that are vacated. Most convincingly, the U.S. holds a veto right in the IMF Executive Board's formal decision-making process. This

means it can and would block significant changes to the organisation's governance long before it entertains notions of leaving (IMF 2010).

Finally, despite China's success in newer institutions independent of an American multilateral consensus, it is doubtful this could be replicated specifically in the older Bretton Woods institutions. Nevertheless, its exponential growth in influence and reach in global economics situates it as a formidable bulwark against potential institutional destabilisation caused by the U.S.'s repudiation of multilateralism. Variable institutional challenges and shifting national interests in global governance, as always, render the future open to a number of possibilities.

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'A Political Instrument and Weapon Used by the West to Enslave' and 'A Tool in the Hands of the Powerful to Destroy the Weak': The International Criminal Court and Populism in Africa

Taylor Hendrickson

In 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and the Gambia announced their intentions to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although only Burundi followed through, these threatened withdrawals still present opportunities to analyse the connection between populism and international institutions. This essay will focus specifically on Burundi and South Africa, arguing that their leaders mask their true selfish intentions for withdrawal with a uniquely African populist rhetoric. After introducing the debates about populism in Africa, the ICC's relationship with Africa, and providing context for the threatened withdrawals, this essay will introduce, discuss the reasons for, and analyse the rhetoric of Burundi and South Africa's threats of withdrawal for populist language and will conclude by discussing the threats' implications for the ICC. Although the African threats to withdraw from the ICC are often dismissed as an African problem or discussed only in reference to the leaders who made these threats, they merit investigation for two reasons. Firstly, the ICC is one of the most important international institutions and is unique because it is simultaneously a legal and highly political institution (Roach 2009, 12). Secondly, it is necessary to examine populism in a non-Western context, as most populism research focuses on the Global North and thus presents an incomplete view populism. More broadly, these threatened withdrawals generate important insights into the interaction between international institutions and populism.

In order to understand these withdrawals, it is necessary to contextualise by describing the debates populism in Africa. Populism has been described as politics that dichotomises 'corrupt elites and the virtuous people', exalting the ordinary people (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, 7). It is often associated with a mistrust of institutions, including political parties, as this 'establishment' is viewed as corrupt (Resnick 2017, 196; Posner 2017, 2). However, some argue that these conceptions of populism only fit Western models of government, with long-standing democracies and established political parties, claiming that populism in the Global South is often far more personalised and less dependent on

existing institutions (Resnick 2017, 116; Kenny 2017, 2-3). This type of populism is seen in Africa, where weaker and relatively new political parties lead to more personalised populism connected to individual leaders (Resnick 2017, 101). In some ways, African populism has similarities to Western populism: populist leaders espouse anti-elite rhetoric and '[mobilise]…the urban poor by promising housing, employment, and public services' (Resnick 2017, 111; Roberts 2018, 250). However, in addition to being distinguished by its association with specific leaders as opposed to parties, African populism is also unique because it involves a level of Pan-Africanism, with a 'policy goal of African unity' (Martin 2012, 3). In order to account for the various manifestations of populism, therefore, some scholars have argued that populism is better seen as a rhetoric or discourse than a monolithic type of politics, as rhetoric can be used by any politician in any context (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, 9-16). Such rhetoric essentially pits corrupt elites and institutions against the 'virtu[ous]' people, claiming that a 'political goals are best achieved by…direct relationship between government and the people' instead of through institutions (Dikeni 2017, 6, 16). This essay will be based on this rhetorical definition of populism, as it is far more universal, and less reliant on Western political ideologies. It suggests that there is, however, a unique African populism found in both of these cases. First, instead of simply critiquing the 'elite', leaders utilising populism appropriate anti-colonial language. Second, on the international level, the idea that governments and the people should have a direct relationship is replaced by notions of sovereignty, which suggest international institutions like the ICC should not have a say in domestic affairs.

Background on the complex relationship between the ICC and Africa is also crucial. The ICC, which punishes genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, was established by the Rome Statute in 1998 and entered into force in 2002 (*Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* 1998). After a decade of both atrocities and democratisation, Africa eagerly participated in the drafting of the Rome Statute, comprising a majority bloc of states that ratified it (Novak 2015, 101; Dersso 2016, 62; Mangu 2015, 9). The initially positive relationship between the ICC and Africa soured when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for (now former) Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2008 and worsened as criticism of the ICC as neo-colonial or racist grew (Clarke, Knottnerus and de Volder 2016, 26). This criticism, now widespread, centres on the fact that all but one ICC case have

involved Africa, while atrocities elsewhere have been ignored (Williams 2016; Allison 2016; Mangu 2015, 24). Others condemn the ICC as part of an international legal system still affected by the colonial history and reliant on imperial and Western concepts (Allo 2018; Gevers 2016). While this essay does not delve into these criticisms, they are important to note because they are paralleled in the official reasons given for withdrawal.

With the context established, this paper will now focus on the Burundian withdrawal and South African threatened withdrawal from the ICC. The Gambia also threatened to withdraw, but will not be discussed in this paper due to space constraints. In 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and the Gambia were States Parties to the ICC, and as such reserved the right to withdraw from the ICC, but must continue cooperating with the ICC for a year after the notice of withdrawal (*Rome Statute* 1998, art. 127). Scholars agree that in all three cases, the withdrawal threats were not reactions to the ICC as an institution, but were instead distractions from 'domestic stressor[s]' (Mkhabela 2017, 4).

Burundi, the first state to announce it intent to withdraw, was the first and only African state to actually withdraw from the ICC (France-Press 2017). It is not often seen as a country associated with populism; however, its leader (former) President Pierre Nkurunziza can be described as a populist due to his methods to drum up support among those 'neglected by his political opponents' in rural areas (McDonald 2015). His favoured methods included working alongside farmers and building unnecessary, yet popular, expensive soccer stadiums (McDonald 2015; Blair 2015). Under Nkurunziza, Burundi had a horrific human rights record and his nomination for an illegal third term resulted in vast human rights abuses, eventually becoming the focus of an ICC preliminary investigation, which began shortly after the intent to withdraw was issued (Vandeginste 2016, 2; France-Presse 2017). Most scholars argue that the decision to withdraw was precipitated potentially by the ICC prosecution of Nkurunziza for human rights abuses, but withdrawal could not stop an investigation started in the year after withdrawal is announced (Feldman 2016; Cronin-Furman and Schwartz 2016). The official justification for this withdrawal included allegations of neo-colonialism and classic populist rhetoric: presidential spokesman Willy Nyamitwe described the ICC as 'a political instrument and weapon used by the west to enslave' and hailed the withdrawal 'a great victory for

Burundi because it ha[d] defended its sovereignty and national pride' (France-Presse 2017). The Burundian parliament also cited concerns of sovereignty, arguing that the ICC wanted to pursue regime change in Burundi (Allison 2016).

Burundi's withdrawal exemplifies populist rhetoric about, and interaction with, international courts. In many cases, international institutions (including courts) are depicted as part of the 'elite,' against which populists pit ordinary people, claiming institutions are focused on elite interests (Posner 2017, 2). This is demonstrated in Nyamitwe's description of the ICC, which depicts the ICC as a 'political instrument', not a court serving victims of serious crimes (France-Presse 2017). However, this fits a unique, internationally focused African populism, as this elite is depicted in terms of the Western powers perceived to be controlling the ICC. Similarly, populist language is used to question the authority of courts, especially in relation to judicial intrusion into domestic politics (Voeten 2019, 17). This is seen in the parliament's emphasis on the ICC as potentially regime-changing and Nyamitwe's focus on 'sovereignty', which suggest that the authority of the ICC impedes Nkurunziza's authority. The emphasis on sovereignty also falls within a broader African populism. This justification of sovereignty echoes the idea that governments should have direct relationships to their people instead of corrupt institutions. In this situation, the corrupt ICC is getting in the way of Nzkurunziza's attempts to directly connect with his people by involving itself in Burundian affairs. Thus, though the likely reason behind withdrawal was to save Nzkurunziza from prosecution and is not populist, the rhetoric used to justify the decision to do so is.

South Africa's intended withdrawal from the ICC was at odds with its historical relationship with the Court. Since the end of Apartheid, South Africa has been heavily involved in seeking justice for international crimes and was the first state to incorporate the Rome Statute into domestic law in 2003 (Kersten 2018; Ssenyonjo 2017). However, South Africa's relationship with the ICC became strained when the government ignored the ICC arrest warrant for Sudan's al-Bashir when he visited South Africa, which violated both domestic and international law (Ssenyonjo 2017; The Economist 2016a; The Economist 2017). The president at the time of al-Bashir's visit was Jacob Zuma, whose decision it was not to arrest al-Bashir and who, though often referred to as authoritarian,

has been referred to as a populist for his policies (Calland 2016). As a leftist economic populist, Zuma aimed to win the support of the working class and trade unions as African National Congress (ANC) leader, removing some higher education fees and redistributing land, albeit years after he first promised to do so (Essa 2018). Zuma has also drawn on racial tensions and identity politics as the cause of inequality in South Africa, but in a much different way than populists employ identity politics in the Global North (Shain 2017, 6).

Many different reasons were given for South Africa's decision to withdraw. Zuma's government claimed the Bashir case highlighted a contradiction between South African respect of head for state immunity and the ICC's request for state cooperation in arrests (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2016). The government also argued compliance with the ICC would prevent South African initiatives to create peace (South African Government News Agency 2016). Minister of Justice Michael Masutha attributed this incompatibility to a 'peace and justice dichotomy' in the ICC (Masutha 2017). Zuma's government also suggested that the ICC is biased against Africa and expressed concern about forced regime change (Onishi 2017; Feldman 2016). Such claims of bias stretch back to the al-Bashir incident, when ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe likened the ICC to 'a tool in the hands of the powerful to destroy the weak' and Justice and Constitutional Development Deputy Minister John Jeffery remarked that the ICC 'had allowed itself to be influenced by powerful non-member states' and served as 'a proxy instrument for these states…to persecute African leaders and effect regime changes' (Reuters 2015). Scholars have suggested, however, that the decision to withdraw was a distraction from internal issues or a part of quest to expand regional power by demonstrating South African commitment to protecting African leaders (The Economist 2016a; The Economist 2016b; Feldman 2016).

South Africa ultimately reversed its intention to withdraw in 2017 due to domestic courts' ruling that withdrawal without parliamentary consent was unconstitutional (Onishi 2017). Nevertheless, there is still insight to be gained from this attempted withdrawal. By depicting the ICC as an institution in the clutches of the 'powerful' and biased against Africa, South Africa utilises the common populist depiction of international institutions as

elite (Posner 2017, 2). Again, this depiction of populist anti-elitism is distinctly African, where the ICC is considered elite because of its track record with the Global North and South, which vary substantially. This anti-colonial idea echoes common criticisms of the ICC, but few of these actual critiques suggest withdrawal is the solution. Meanwhile, South Africa's other concerns—competing legal obligations regarding immunity, potential regime change in Africa, and a desire to pursue regional peace—seem legitimate, but do not provide a logical basis for withdrawal. The South African High Court had previously ruled that immunity would not apply in the case of al-Bashir and international law also prohibits such immunity (Chenwi and Sucker 2015, 203; International Commission of Jurists 2017, 7). Concerns about peace are also unsubstantiated, as there is no explanation for how to achieve peace without achieving justice (Zitke, Roux, Strydom and Bilchitz, 22). Instead, these issues are covers for another populist tactic: questioning the authority of an international institution (Voeten 2019, 2-3). This is intimately connected to the idea of governments' relationships with the people and the African populist emphasis on sovereignty. South Africa essentially insists that the ICC is threatening its sovereignty by imposing its rules about heads of state above South Africa's domestic law and disrupting the peace processes it leads. South Africa is also concerned with the sovereignty of others with the ICC's potential transformation of governments by prosecuting heads of state. This emphasis on peace processes and consideration of other regional governments ties into the pan-Africanism found in much African populism. However, taken as a whole, this oblique concern with sovereignty suggests that the ICC is a corrupt interloper between the government and the people. As seen in Burundi, populist rhetoric is used for personal gain, by distracting from Zuma's domestic problems of corruption and disrespect for rule of law (Posner 2017, 2; The Economist 2016a).

Despite the fact that only Burundi actually withdrew, the threatened withdrawals still presented potential problems for the ICC. On a basic level, withdrawals would have limited the Court's jurisdiction, rendering it difficult for the Court to serve justice for victims (Bosco 2016). Furthermore, immediately following the withdrawal announcements, there appeared to be the risk of a 'domino effect' of other African states withdrawing, meaning that the ICC would lose almost all of its cases (Belay 2017; Dersso, 64). However, the most fundamental problem is that the threats question the legitimacy of

the ICC. The ICC's legitimacy stems from norms and values, but as a treaty-based organisation, it is reliant on the acquiescence of states that have specific political interests (Seymour 2016, 110). Thus, the ICC's legitimacy is threatened when states accuse it of hypocrisy, as these states did when they suggested that the Court was not in fact universal, but instead controlled by Western power politics (Seymour 2016, 109). This threat was widespread, as it had the potential to affect the opinions of states considering joining the ICC (Dersso, 64). While legitimacy issues such as the ICC's focus on Africa and the controversial role of the United Nations Security Council are important, it is unlikely that Nkurunziza and Zuma, who both violated domestic and international law, hope to improve international justice by leaving the ICC. Instead, the same populist attack of elites seen on the domestic level is once again transferred to the international level, where international institutions are used as distractions and scapegoats (Posner 2017, 2).

However, the threats of withdrawal, as well as the actual withdrawal, did not permanently damage the ICC. Despite the fact that Burundi withdrew, the preliminary investigation into Burundi continues because the crimes fell within the ICC's jurisdiction and the investigation began before formal withdrawal completed (Vandeginste 2016, 4-5). Additionally, the feared mass withdrawal of African states never came to fruition (Kuwono 2017). The fact that no mass withdrawal happened and that many African states pledged their continuing commitment to the ICC suggests that its legitimacy in Africa has not eroded entirely (International Federation for Human Rights 2017). Additionally, the threats from African populists did not affect the legitimacy of the ICC in the eyes of the vast majority of the other States Parties, who continue to fund and support the ICC (Bosco 2016). Thus, though the populist labelling of the ICC as elite and the questioning of its authority may have temporarily distracted some from domestic issues in Burundi, South Africa, and the Gambia, it ultimately was unable to change this important international institution.

The Burundian and South African threats to withdraw from the ICC in 2016 demonstrate the ways in which populism as rhetoric can call into question the legitimacy of international institutions. This specific populism took on a uniquely African form by replacing anti-elitism with anti-colonial language, and by appealing to ideas of

sovereignty to paint the ICC as interceding in relationship between African governments and their peoples. This analysis does not suggest that there is no merit to concerns over colonialism or sovereignty simply because they have been appropriated by populism (Kyle and Gultchin 2018). In fact, the withdrawal threats exploit the very real problems of bias in the ICC, which the ICC must address for its future legitimacy (Keppler 2012, 7; Mensa-Bonsu 2015, 47). Nevertheless, populism spreads far beyond Africa and its rhetoric can be used to question an international institution's authority and consequently, its legitimacy (Voeten 2019, 11). The populist critique of the ICC is alive and well outside Africa: the Philippines recently withdrew from the ICC at the behest of populist President Rodrigo Duterte and populist US President Donald Trump's National Security Advisor John Bolton has called for sanctions and travel bans on ICC staff (Gutierrez 2019; Stelzenmüller 2018). The threat posed to the ICC is insidious: the purpose of the ICC is to end the impunity of elite politicians, but populist depictions of the ICC as elitist jeopardise this mission, making it difficult to obtain justice for victims. These victims are ordinary individuals who comprise 'the people' populist leaders claim to represent. However, this concern should be viewed with caution. Burundi was the only state that actually withdrew and the ICC investigation into Burundi continues. On the whole, most states still seem to support the ICC, with many African states publicly declaring their commitment to the court (Belay 2017). Furthermore, populist threats to courts and institutions are not new: similar threats are wielded against domestic courts and institutions (Mangu 2015, 28). The difference is that domestic courts and institutions can be manipulated and controlled by individual leaders; the ICC cannot (Voeten 2019, 18). The ICC's legitimacy may be questioned and its flaws exposed, but with 123 States Parties, it will not be significantly damaged by the threats of a few (Assembly of States Parties). Instead, like all international institutions, the ICC will continue to stand firm as long as it has broad support. Populists have not and will not stop the ICC in pursuing its goal: achieving justice for the world's innocent victims of atrocities.

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Assessing the Impact of Right-Wing Populism on Humanitarian Aid: The Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Germany

Carolina Ernst

Introduction

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, '[Humanitarian aid] operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of human or man-made disasters' (2007). In 2012, the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) pledged a total of €1,317 million to humanitarian aid causes (Broberg 2014, 166), making the European Union a major global contributor to humanitarian aid. In European Council Regulation 1257/96, the EU outlines the objective of Humanitarian aid more specifically as helping people who were the victims of 'natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters' (Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 1996). Foreign aid more generally involves efforts by developed countries to reduce poverty and inequality in a number of sectors in developing countries (Brown and Grävingholt 2016, 4). Whereas foreign aid has become increasingly concerned with the security concerns of donor countries, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid outlines that humanitarian aid should be based on core principles of neutrality, humanity, independence, and impartiality (ECHO 2017).

However, a key concern of populism is the politicization of topics which they believe are not adequately addressed (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 205). Right-wing populist parties such as the Fronte National in France, the Sweden Democrats and the Alternative for Germany are steadily increasing in popularity and their goals are becoming increasingly important to acknowledge. Hence, the aim of this essay is to investigate how populist parties in Europe perceive humanitarian aid provision, and whether these perceptions pose a realistic threat to the EU's current leading humanitarian position. I take EU humanitarian aid to entail both the aid provided by the European Commission, but also from the individual Member States. Due to the scope of analysis, I have selected two parties, the Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Germany.

I will begin by exploring the policy positions of the Sweden Democrats and the Alternative for Germany, before placing these in the context of EU humanitarian aid provision to assess its possible impact. Despite the strengthening of the right-wing populist movement throughout Europe, there is mixed evidence of its impact on EU humanitarian aid provision, as the Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Germany diverge in their views on aid volumes and principles, and there is already evidence in shifts towards the politicization of humanitarian aid in the European Union.

Case Selection and Methodology

To analyse the impact of the right-wing populist movement on Humanitarian Aid provision in the European Union, I have selected two parties, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) and the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). The two parties were selected based on their similarities but also their differences.

Firstly, due to recent federal elections - held in 2018 and 2017 for Sweden and Germany respectively - and the upcoming European Parliamentary elections, both parties have recently published election manifestos. As neither party has published a manifesto in English, relevant sections have been translated into English by the author. Furthermore, Sweden and Germany are two major contributors to international aid; in 2017 Sweden contributed €734.92 million whereas Germany contributed €5.38 billion ('EU Aid Explorer' 2019). However, the parties also differ in terms of their political experiences. SD was first elected to the Swedish Parliament in 2010 ('Valresultat' 2010), whereas the AfD was not elected to the German Bundestag until 2017 (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017). Hence, the comparison may also offer an idea of the evolution of populist parties who have been elected to parliament. I analyse the parties' manifestos in terms of their views on humanitarian aid and the principles that guide humanitarian aid, as well as their perceptions of the European Union more generally.

The Sweden Democrats (SD)

The Sweden Democrats (SD), led by Jimmie Åkesson, won 17.5% of the vote in the 2018 federal elections ('Valresultat' 2018). In their manifesto for the federal elections, the Sweden Democrats refer to themselves as the most 'aid-friendly' party in Sweden, seeking

to promote foreign aid that would create opportunities for impoverished people to improve their living standards ('Valmanifest' 2018). Additionally, the party looks to promote humanitarian aid to enable the return of migrants to their country of origin in a post-conflict situation ('Valmanifest' 2018).

The Sweden Democrats make no direct indication of whether they would prefer decision-making on humanitarian aid to be made on a national rather than EU-wide basis. However, a referendum for Sweden to leave the European Union is proposed, from which I can deduce that SD would prefer for decision-making regarding humanitarian aid to be conducted at a national level.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD)

The Alternative for Germany was founded in 2013 and is led by Jörg Meuthen and Alexander Gauland. The party received 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 German federal elections (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017). Unlike SD, the AfD does not believe that countries should directly engage themselves with humanitarian aid, rather arguing that it should be the task of churches and charitable organizations ('Europawahlprogramm' 2019). Additionally, the AfD believes that aid to developing countries should take place mainly in the form of market-based solutions in which these countries gain increased access to international markets ('Europawahlprogramm' 2019).

Analysis: Patterns of Right-Wing Populism

Populism is often characterized as a thin-centred ideology, meaning that it does 'not articulate a comprehensive and distinct position on a full range of social, economic and political issues' (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015, 533), rather focusing on a single concern. One of the defining elements of right-wing Populism in Europe is immigration, and the securitization of immigrants, recently particularly defining Muslim refugees as a common opponent (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 497). The AfD defines immigrants as a threat to 'European Culture' ('Europawahlprogramm' 2019), while the Sweden Democrats define the European Union as a threat that may lead to the forced acceptance of migrants. Additionally, the position is emphasized by the Sweden Democrats' suggestion to

implement transit centres for refugees outside the European Union ('Valplattform Europaparlamentsvalet' 2019).

Humanitarian aid, particularly when providing support in the areas of refugees' origins, can reduce immigration. Humanitarian Crises often spark large migration flows, for example in the case of the large migration flows to Europe as a result of conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East (Pusterla and Pusterla 2018, 536). The Sweden Democrats acknowledge the usefulness of humanitarian aid as a tool to reduce immigration to Europe arguing that humanitarian aid should be used to encourage repatriation ('Valplattform Europaparlamentsvalet' 2019). In contrast to the AfD, who does not believe governments should be responsible for humanitarian aid provision, SD retains a sense of the cosmopolitanism which humanitarian aid is based on ('Europawahlprogramm' 2019), but, as I will discuss later, challenges other core principles. Hence, humanitarian aid becomes a point of divergence for the European right-wing populist movement.

In terms of positioning regarding the European Union, both parties express a desire for their countries to leave the European Union or at least hold a referendum to vote on Union membership. A key feature of populism is its view of itself as a correction to 'a democracy that somehow has come to be too 'elite-driven' (Müller 2016, 10-11). Populist parties often contrast the desire of the people, with that of the political elite in Brussels (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015, 535). This juxtaposition of people and elite is apparent in the Sweden Democrats' election manifesto, which states that through the increased use of majority voting in the European Parliament, smaller countries are virtually excluded from decision-making ('Valmanifest' 2018).

The Basis for EU Humanitarian Aid

European Union humanitarian aid policy is characterized by an interplay between collective action decided upon by the European Commission, Parliament and Council, and the bilateral action taken by the individual Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon stresses that 'the Union's measures and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other' (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). From a neo-liberal institutionalist point of view, the

coordination and collectivization of humanitarian aid policy is a tool to maximize the gains from, in this case, humanitarian aid (Burchill 2013, 67).

The first framework for European Union humanitarian aid provision, which remains in place to date, was set up under European Council Regulation 1257/96, adopted in 1996, which designated responsibility for humanitarian aid provision to the European Commission (Broberg 2014, 166). The European Commission forms part of the legal basis of the European Union, its tasks including legislation and representation (Kassim et al. 2013, 1). Under the regulation, the Commission is authorized to make decisions regarding humanitarian aid provision up to 10 million ECU in the case of emergency action but also cooperates with the European Parliament and Council (Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 1996). The Subsequent creation of the Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) further centralized decision-making (Irrera 2018, 49).

What makes the EU unique in its aid provision is the effort to collectivize the visions of its Member States around a united goal (Carbone 2015, 898). Legally, each Member State may take individual humanitarian aid action on top of collective Union action (Pusterla and Pusterla 2018, 536). Morten Broberg summarizes that the 'coherence principle entails that humanitarian aid cannot be used to further other policies of the donor, but the [independence] principle does not prohibit a donor from taking due account of its humanitarian aid obligations' (Broberg 2014, 169). Typically, European Union legislation in regards to a particular issue would prevent the Member States from legislating on the same matter; however, when development cooperation and humanitarian aid was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, it provided for 'shared competence without pre-emption' (Broberg 2014, 167). However, 'the Commission may take any measure necessary to promote close coordination between its own activities and those of the Member States' (Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 1996). Hence, states may take bilateral humanitarian action, but such action must comply with overriding EU norms and existing policies, so as to uphold consistency and efficiency.

Synthesis: Populism and EU Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid in Europe has developed between the common policies sought by the EU, and the individual goals pursued by member states (Irrera 2018, 46). Based on the notion that both SD and the AfD would like their respective countries to leave the European Union in favour of more 'sovereign' decision-making, I can deduce that both of these parties would also favour decision-making on humanitarian aid to be returned to a state-level. According to current policy, there is a parallel between policy created by the European Union that pursued by individual Member states, as according to the Lisbon Treaty, 'the Union shall have the competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in the Member States being prevented from exercising theirs' (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Hence, even though the Sweden Democrats and AfD, if in power, would pursue different humanitarian aid strategies, this may not have a major overall effect on the conduct of European Union aid policy, as states are also 'expected to respect the EU principles, which are in line with humanitarian principles, as applied on a global scale' (Irrera 2018, 50), and the European Commission may take action to maintain coherence. To synthesize EU regulations and populist perceptions, I will discuss the potential impacts of right-wing populism on the volume and principles of humanitarian aid provision.

Existing scholarship has further argued that 'aid from multilateral organizations tends to follow the most powerful members' interest when their interests converge' (Kim and Jensen 2018, 178). At the time of writing, the members with the largest number of seats in the European Parliament are Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom (European Parliament 2018). Hence, they should have the most power in aid decision-making, as the European Commission cooperates with the Parliament and Council on humanitarian aid decision-making (Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 1996). In Pusterla and Pusterla's investigation of responses to the 2015 Refugee Crisis, these four countries all devoted between 40 and 60 per cent of their humanitarian aid budget to the migrant crisis, showing a relative similarity in solidarity (Pusterla and Pusterla 2018, 542). The level of solidarity is a stark contrast to the AfD's opposition to humanitarian aid, who, as mentioned, believe should be provided by churches and charity organizations ('Europawahlprogramm' 2019). In contrast, Sweden spent only 8% of its humanitarian aid budget on the migrant crisis

(Pusterla and Pusterla 2018, 542), and the discourse in SD's election manifesto does not assert the same opposition to humanitarian aid. The overall effect on aid volumes is thus likely to be limited, as EU humanitarian regulation would likely oppose the AfD's goal to eliminate humanitarian aid, whereas the Sweden Democrats take a more moderate initial position.

Although highly unlikely, the possible consequences of a return to nationally-based decision-making on humanitarian aid are mixed. Given that the Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Germany have divergent views on humanitarian aid provision, individual consequences would likely be uncertain. However, currently, 'ECHO and state performance are quite homogenous and the commitment to humanitarian aid policy tends to converge' (Irrera 2018, 50). According to Kim and Jensen, smaller states such as Denmark and Sweden most closely follow those policies put forward by the EU (Kim and Jensen 2018, 185). The Sweden Democrats diverge in their views on aid in that whereas SD would like to keep up humanitarian aid provision, but encourage its use for repatriation purposes, the AfD would prefer for humanitarian aid provision to be delegated to churches and charity organizations. The AfD's suggestion would indicate a significant decrease in the volume of aid provision, particularly given the fact that Germany pledged €3.84 billion to aid in 2017 ('EU Aid Explorer' 2019). The combination of the desired redistribution in aid purposes and an overall reduction in aid would threaten EU aid. Even if there were no definitive effect on aid volumes from returning decision-making to a national level as desired by right-wing populism, 'stronger EU co-ordination would enhance the overall humanitarian response' (ECHO 2007).

From the rhetoric securitizing immigrants that is evident in both SD and the AfD, we can deduce that this may lead to the securitization of humanitarian aid, in relation to their migration policies and views. Overall, 'aid instruments [have become] increasingly intertwined with complex international operations that [address] development and security simultaneously' (Brown and Grävingholt 2016, 1). The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid states that 'impartiality denotes that humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations' (ECHO 2007). However, in its manifesto, the SD state their motivation to

promote the return of people post-conflict, and promoting an environment to make repatriation possible ('Valmanifest' 2018). This directly contrasts to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, and that 'Respect for independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives form political, economic, military or other objectives,' (ECHO 2007). Hence, whereas the Alternative for Germany challenges humanitarian aid provisions through grants as a whole, the Sweden Democrats challenge some of its fundamental principles.

However, changes in the composition of European Union, Humanitarian Aid have already been noted separately from the rise of right-wing populism. Charlotte Dany argues that the European Union itself contributes to a politicization of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid, like foreign aid more generally, can be used to further policy and security objectives (Brown and Grävingholt 2016, 6). As previously mentioned, '[Humanitarian aid] operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people' (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Nevertheless, for example, the developmentalization of humanitarian aid may be seen as a form of politicization, wherein humanitarian aid also seeks to advance more longstanding development targets (Dany 2015). A large proportion of the work ECHO does have a strong long-term focus, with programs aimed at creating 'unrestrained transition between phases of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, and finally providing development assistance' (Harat, Chojnaki and Leksowski 2015, 67). The shift from humanitarian aid as a short-term solution, to its use as a more long-term policy tool, can be seen as a form of politicization (Dany 2015). Hence, whereas the current threat of right-wing populism may be constrained by existing norms and regulations, these norms appear to be evolving, making future impacts more uncertain.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Germany both challenge current humanitarian aid practices, both in terms of aid volumes and the principles of humanitarian aid provision. However, the legal structure of European Union humanitarian aid policy makes effects on aid volumes less likely and politicization of humanitarian aid more generally in the European Union already appears to occur.

Additionally, Humanitarian aid is a point of divergence in right-wing populism, where some see humanitarian as a political tool to promote objectives of immigrant repatriation as in the case of the Sweden Democrats, and others, in this case, the Alternative for Germany, do not believe in its provision as part of the government budget. Hence, an analysis of their possible implications for Humanitarian Aid provision acknowledges that these divergences are part of limiting the overall effect. Nevertheless, the critical views of EU-coordinated humanitarian aid challenge its current effectiveness. Overall, 'The objective of EU humanitarian aid is to provide a needs-based emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity wherever the need arises' (ECHO 2007).

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The Turkish Question: National Populism, Imagery and 'Othering' During the 2016 EU Referendum

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During the 2016 EU Referendum, the issue of future Turkish membership of the Union became a surprisingly salient one (Ker-Lindsay 2017, 1). Officially becoming a candidate member in 1999 (Kaymacki 2017), Turkey's negotiations to become a member state had since stalled due to their inability to resolve tensions with Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay 2017, 3) and the increase in domestic authoritarianism by the Erdogan government (Connolly and Rankin 2017). Indeed, by the time of the referendum, Turkey had only opened 15 of the 35 chapters of the EU accession process, closing only one of them (Icener and Phinnemore 2016). Historically, the UK has been a key supporter of Turkish accession (UK Parliament 2013), with then Prime Minister David Cameron claiming in 2014 that he supported such a policy (Hope 2014). Against this backdrop, the *Turkish question* (that of the state's potential membership of the EU) emerged as one of the key debates of the referendum, with associates of various Eurosceptic groups warning that continued British membership would soon see us share a union with Turkey. This essay seeks to analyse how those campaigning for a leave vote in the referendum weaponised the *Turkish question* through the use of images. Utilising constructivist theory, I will examine how leave campaigners embarked on a process of 'othering', seeking to characterise Turkey as an economic threat, physical threat and, most importantly, a threat to British identity (Tong and Zuo 2018, 3). This campaign is part of a broader national populist turn in the UK, with groups of this disposition seeking to establish a monolithic 'British' community through the demonization of the 'other'. I will begin with an analysis of the theory behind the research, before exploring the existing perceptions of migration as a 'threat' in the UK. Afterwards, I will demonstrate how the processes of 'othering' were evident in the videos and images propagated by leave campaigners during the referendum. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of such a process and how it relates to the wider trend of national populism in the UK.

National Populism and 'Othering'

Two key concepts require clarification before embarking upon the analysis: 'othering' and 'populism'. The former pertains to social constructivist theory, which seeks to explore the relationships between actors and how this affects their identity (Rumelili 2008, 99). MacMillan describes how identity construction can be facilitated by elite actors within society, especially when the narratives propagated by such figures tie into existing perceptions of identity within the general populace (MacMillan 2012, 216). Such an idea relates directly to this research project: how *elites* (though some would reject this characterisation) in the anti-EU campaign tapped into existing prejudices and fears regarding migration in an attempt to foster an indigenous social identity. It is crucial to remember that identity cannot exist in a vacuum, it is always relational to a 'constitutive other', the perceptions of which shape the identity of the group in question (Reinke de Buitrago 2012, XIV). Characterisations of this 'other' are almost always negative, with those who perceive themselves to be civilized seeing the 'other' as 'barbaric' and those who embrace their western nature viewing 'others' as 'oriental' (Hall 2002, 104). The dichotomous relationship between 'self' and 'other' can be depicted by elites in society in a variety of fashions, though for the purposes of this essay I will focus on the power of imagery in constructing the 'other'. The images I will examine seek to situate Turkish people within the context of existing fears of migration amongst the British public.

The second concept is one that has drawn considerable debate within academic and policy-making circles of late. Populism is a phenomenon where political figures claim to be fully representative of the true will of a homogenous people, rallying against corrupt 'elites' (Muller 2017, 1-7). However, populism is a 'thin ideology' that manifests itself in combinations with other, more expansive ideologies (Stanley 2008). The variant of populism that was prominent during the referendum campaign is what Eatwell and Goodwin call 'national populism' which seeks to promote the will of the people in opposition to a perceived liberal, cosmopolitan elite (2018, x-xi). As a movement, it rejects liberal globalisation and, crucially, mass immigration (Goodwin 2018). Both populism and 'othering' are intrinsically linked in that they relate directly to identity (Fukuyama, 2018); described by Wendt as 'relatively stable, role specific understandings about self' (1992, 397). If one understands themselves in relation to 'others' and if national populists seek to

alter the group identity of the nation, then it is natural that 'othering' becomes a powerful tool in any populist's arsenal. It is worth noting at this point that there needn't be just one 'other'. Populist Eurosceptics seek to contrast the British people with both self-serving political 'elites' and external 'others' such as migrants. As will be discussed later, the case uniquely pertains to both these narratives, with potential Turkish membership depicted as part of an elite agenda that went against the wishes of the British people (BBC 2016c).

Migration as a threat

As aforementioned, the success of 'othering' as a political tool is contingent on whether the messages propagated are based on the existing perceptions of the public. As Neumann argues, the Turk has historically played the role of 'other' to European civilization, largely due to the religious dichotomy that existed between the two (1999, 39-50). He asserts that the historical perceptions of Turkey as Islamic, barbaric and a 'sick man' crucially shape modern debates with regards to its relationship with Europe (Ibid, 62). Therefore, the reason that the *Turkish question* resonated so strongly with the UK public was that it was grounded in a deep-rooted European scepticism of Turkey. It also played upon the well-established fear of migration in the UK. Tong and Zuo describe how migrants are perceived to be a threat to British interests on three levels; physical, economic and cultural (2018, 3). The former dynamic is easy to grasp; people fear that increased migration will result in greater levels of crime and terror. This idea is not entirely unfounded, with Schmid claiming that whilst the number of terrorists in mass migration movements is low, uncontrolled migration of refugees does indeed increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks on home soil (2016, 4).

Furthermore, despite there being no credible link between migration and crime rates (Bell et al 2010, 19), media outlets portray migrants as 'folk devils' responsible for deviance in society (Tong and Zuo, 2018, 19). In terms of economics, many British people perceive migrants to place excessive strain on public services (Statista 2016). Welfare chauvinism has become widespread, with migrants often viewed as leeches on the system, this notion at least partly due to the proliferation of anti-migrant narratives in the tabloid media (Balch and Balanbanova 2017, 252). This attitude was also bolstered by cuts administered by the Conservative government since their election in 2010, placing strain on the funding

for key services such as hospitals and schools (Emmerson 2015). Lastly, migrants are perceived as a threat to 'Britishness'. In recent years, Britain has experienced 'hyper ethnic change', which has led many to query whether such developments will lead to the 'destruction' of indigenous British culture (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018, 131-132). Particular scepticism is reserved for Muslim migrants, with 48% of Britons seeing their values as incompatible with British society (Statista 2013). All of these 'threats' can be identified within the chosen images, though the latter is most noticeable.

Furthermore, British scepticism towards migration was exacerbated by the onset of the European migrant crisis, which in 2015 saw one million refugees arrive into Europe (BBC, 2016a). Prior to the referendum, Turkey hosted a population of 1.7 million Syrian refugees (the largest refugee community in the world) (Icduygu 2015), undoubtedly a factor in propelling it from the periphery of the Brexit debate to the forefront. That many of these refugees were Muslim played into the narrative of migration as a 'cultural threat' and that they arrived from war-torn Syria helped further the idea of Turkish membership as a security issue to the UK. The sheer number of refugees residing in Turkey at the time of the campaign gave the Eurosceptic campaigners a clear 'other' to exploit for their political agenda and added greater importance to the issue of the 'Turkish Question'.

Image-based 'othering' in the 2016 referendum campaign

Image analysis provides one with an interesting method to examine the self-other dichotomy with regards to the 'Turkish Question'. Images are not merely reflections of reality; they are socially-constructed, often for ideological purposes (Lewitt and Van Leeuwen 2008, 7). Therefore, one must engage critically with political images and think carefully about the social effects of their propagation (Rose 2001, 15-16). Fyfe and Law's assertion that images are often utilised to depict 'social difference' (1988, 1) is useful in elucidating this case study: how do the chosen images depict the migrant 'other' as fundamentally different to the people of Britain? It is also important to remember that images very seldom emerge in the public domain without words and phrases which supplement their message (Lewitt and Van Leeuwen 2008, 7). Therefore, my study will not only seek to examine the chosen images but also the words that accompany them, to determine exactly the nature of the social meaning they imparted onto the public. The

images I have chosen were circulated by the Eurosceptic campaign groups during the 2016 referendum and relate directly to Turkey's potential membership of the EU. Other prominent images (such as the infamous 'Breaking Point' billboard (Mason and Stewart 2016)) were not selected as they were not specifically directed at Turkey, but refugees in general.

The first image (Figure 1.1) is a leaflet distributed to houses nationwide and proliferated online by the official campaign for Brexit, Vote Leave. It claims that 'the EU is letting in more and more countries', one of which is Turkey, which has a population of 76 million. Turkey is red on the map, a potent warning of the danger it poses which contrasts starkly with the benign blue of Britain; immediately, the difference between the indigenous British and the Turkish 'other' is established. The most striking aspect of the image is the emphasis on countries that Turkey borders; Iraq and Syria. By highlighting the geographical proximity of Turkey to such states, the image deliberately seeks to construct Turkey as distinctively Middle Eastern- tapping into existing perceptions of the region as 'oriental' (Said 2003) and holding fundamentally different values to Britain and the West (note that its land border with the 'civilised' Greece is not highlighted). Such a characterisation of Turkey meant that Britain's nature as (in the words of Shakespeare) 'a fortress built by nature for herself' was emphatically under threat from culturally incompatible 'others', positioning Brexit as the only way to reassert British strength and glory (Sykes 2018, 141). Furthermore, previous depictions of Syria (Powell 2015) and Iraq (BBC 2014) in the British media (correctly) highlight the humanitarian crises and endemic poverty in these war-torn states. Therefore, by associating Turkey with these states geographically, this poster seeks to emphasise its inherent security threat to the UK; allowing it to join the EU would mean inviting a violent and unstable people into Britain. Another key feature of the image is the battle arrow drawn from Turkey to the UK. Such imagery harkens back to the WWII era and suggests that Turkish EU membership will catalyse an 'invasion' of Britain by dangerous migrant 'others'. By portraying the 'Turkish Question' in such binary and sensationalist terms, the Vote Leave campaign sought to stoke passionate jingoistic sentiment and exacerbate the well-established fears of the British people regarding migration. Thus, this image seeks to demonstrate the inherent

cultural and security threat of Turkish membership of the EU, by constructing it as a decidedly Middle-Eastern invader.

Figure 1.1

Figure 1.2

The second image (Figure 1.2) was released by Vote Leave on 23 May 2016 and states that 'Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU'. The image was circulated via the official Vote Leave Twitter account, receiving 385 retweets (Vote Leave 2016), demonstrating significant public spread. Again, red is used to accentuate the notion of Turkey as a peril to the UK. The image also shows multiple sets of muddy footprints leading through an EU passport which acts as a door, suggesting that continued EU membership will result in Turkish migrants flooding the UK. The dirty footprints play an important symbolic role, drawing connotations of barbarism and social inferiority. The narrative being purported is that migration places a heavy strain on the UK and offers little benefit in return, reflective of the idea of 'economic threat' discussed earlier. The overall message conveyed is that streams of culturally inferior Turkish migrants will arrive on British shores to take advantage of the welfare state.

That no footprints are shown leaving the door to the UK is telling- the Leave campaign sought only to recognise perceived negative aspects of migration and made no effort to highlight the fact that freedom of movement works both ways. Indeed, this poster is a typical example of a 'moral panic'. This phenomenon occurs when a particular group are seen as a threat to societal values, inducing hysteria amongst the public with regards to how to deal with the issue (Eades 2018, 92). 'Moral panics' exaggerate potential threats to societal harmony (Ibid.) and are most likely to manifest themselves when societies are undergoing anxious social changes (Lumby and Funnell 2011, 278), which an austerity-riven Britain was experiencing during the crisis. By creating a sensational threat, Vote Leave sought not to depict the issue as a nuanced one but as one of definitive Turkish membership, which induced rational panic amongst an electorate who naturally feared the prospect of 76 million potential migrants. As Ker-Lindsay points out, the assertion that Turkey would join was patently false- they were in no position to join in the immediate future (2017, 12). This highlights the established link between populist groups and post-truth politics, with the Leave campaign seeking to manipulate the truth to create a 'moral panic' that would help bolster their cause.

The analysis can be stretched beyond images to include a video released as a party-political broadcast by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) weeks prior to the referendum

campaign. The 4-minute video was broadcast on both the BBC and ITV (Payne 2016) and has been viewed over 37,000 times on UKIP's official YouTube page (UKIP 2016), meaning it reached a significant audience across the UK. Whilst the video contains much dialogue, I will focus on the visual aspect and how such images contribute to the 'othering' of the Turks. The opening section shows mosques and bazaars juxtaposed with graffiti and a video of a police vehicle. The intention here is clear; to draw an association between Islam and social disorder. As Abrams and Hogg elucidate, the 'self' is always the epitome of law and order, whilst the 'other' represents chaos and crime (1988, 17). This video purports such a narrative displaying graphics that emphasise Turkey's lower average income and higher crime rates than the UK, in attempt to highlight the fundamental social differences between the two. When taken in context with the other images, a cumulative message becomes apparent; Christian Europe is fighting a battle for survival against an imminent Islamic invasion. This video shrewdly plays on existing islamophobia in Britain, seeking to bolster the notion of a 'clash of civilizations' between the Islamic East and Europe and position Brexit as the only viable solution to counteract the spread of Islamism. Indeed, it is important to note that the areas with the most exposure to immigration were those in favour of Remain, with those who voted to Leave being from areas of low migration (Travis 2016). This demonstrates that it was fear of migration (not migration itself) that drove the referendum result, fear which was expertly propagated by UKIP in this video.

National Populism and 'Othering'

The 'othering' campaign undertaken against Turkey and its people during the 2016 EU referendum fits into a wider narrative of national populism in the UK. As discussed earlier, the overall goal of national populists is to foster nationalism and win political power by challenging the perceived influence of societal 'elites'. The campaign against Turkey served this purpose; it bolstered a sense of British nationalism in opposition to the barbaric and Islamic 'other' whilst also allowing for criticism of a liberal elite intent on facilitating Turkey's entry into the European Union. Part of the narrative put forward by leading Brexiteers (BBC 2016) and Eurosceptic media outlets (Groves and Slack 2016) was that the current Conservative government was 'lying' to the people over their intentions regarding Turkey. The idea here is to portray governmental elites as 'enemies of the people' and to reinforce the populists' claims of ownership of the true voice of the British

public (Muller 2017, 4). The official Vote Leave campaign also sought to portray the EU as a manipulative body, making a misleading tweet claiming that it was building interpreter booths for a Turkish delegation in the new EU building (these were actually for Turkish speakers from the Cypriot delegation) (Ker-Lindsay 2017, 9) Thus, the focus on the 'Turkish Question' in the campaign had a dual use as a solidifier of nationalism but also as grounds to convey the populist perspective of a corrupt elite who act against the interests of wider society.

As the aforementioned tweet demonstrates, national populists are willing to achieve their goals by any means necessary, even if this means being economical with the truth. Indeed, populist politicians rely on parsimonious representations of society that are not based on fact, deliberately distorting reality so as to pander to the fears of the electorate (Mannion and Speed 2017, 250) with Eurosceptic campaign groups repeatedly circulating the false idea that Turkey's membership in the EU was imminent. For populists, the truth is a matter of political expediency, with Eurosceptics such as Penny Mordaunt claiming that the UK could not veto Turkish membership, clearly misusing her platform to propagate falsehoods that accentuated the fears of the British people (BBC 2016d). Indeed, the whole concept of the 'other' need not be based in fact. The creation of 'others' is a social process that relies on exploiting fear via sensationalism and views the truth as a mere afterthought. Indeed, with the rise of social media (the medium through which these images were propagated), 'fake news' is becoming increasingly problematic, which allows those of the national populist disposition to more easily put forward misleading narratives.

The final way that the 'othering' of Turkey relates to the wider national populist movement is that they both demonstrate the salience of 'identity politics' in the modern political sphere. As Ker-Lindsay points out, the Remain campaign appeared to win the economic debate but still managed to lose the referendum (2017, 8). More so than perceived economic or security threats, the idea of Turkish migrants distorting British culture was evident in the images and throughout the referendum campaign. That the Brexiteers chose to place great emphasis on the cultural impact of Turkish membership demonstrates the importance of identity in shaping modern political phenomena. The

power of identity exploitation goes some way in explaining the success of national populist politics in the UK and abroad; as such groups tend to focus more on culture as opposed to economic populists, who attempt to rally support on class grounds (Metz 2018).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 'othering' of Turkey during the 2016 EU referendum campaign was an example of populist forces at work. Seeking to entrench nationalist identity, those campaigning to leave the EU portrayed Turkey as a fundamental threat to Britain on multiple levels. This analysis demonstrated how clever manipulation of images sought to entrench the perception of Turkey as inferior to the United Kingdom and encourage voters to 'take back control' of borders so as to mitigate against this threat. One can also see wider trends associated with national populism through the Turkish 'othering' campaign, namely the increasing prominence of post-truth politics, the narrative of a corrupt elite acting against the will of the people and the power of identity politics in the modern political sphere.

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